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Not A Closed Case: The Wisconsin
Open Presidential Primary
By Belly Hansen Richardson*
Introduction
Much local, state, and national decisionmaking flows through
political parties, yet in most activities, parties face few constitutional
restraints' and are relatively free from statutory recognition or regula-
tion.2 Although a key function of a political party is to nominate can-
didates for political office, this function is one instance in which party
activity is regulated by the states. In states where a party's nominating
process is achieved by means of a primary election,3 the state regulates
the party through its primary election laws.
* B.A., 1976, University of Idaho; member, third year class. The author would like to
dedicate this note to her parents, Fred and Angeline Hansen. She would also like to thank
her husband, Peter J. Richardson, for his valuable advice and invaluable support.
1. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). "Partisan politics bears the imprima-
tur only of tradition, not the Constitution." Id at 369 n.22.
2. State ex rel La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 491, 287 N.W.2d 519,
526 (1980), rev'dsub nom. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981). See also A. RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEF OF FACTION 13-15, 78-80 (1975); V.
KEY, PARTIES, POLITICS AND PRESSURE GROUPS 687-91 (5th ed. 1964).
3. Primary elections are of three types: closed, open, and blanket. Voters in a closed
primary election are required to comply with tests establishing party affiliation prior to vot-
ing. These partisan affiliation requirements are set out by state legislatures, and an individ-
ual's affiliation with a political party is a matter of public record.
Open primary systems require neither a public declaration nor a public recordation of
party affiliation. In an open primary election, a voter affiliates with a political party only
after he or she selects the party ballot of his or her choice in the privacy of the polling booth.
In an open primary, a voter is not permitted to vote for candidates on more than one party's
ballot. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.37(4) (West Supp. 1980). "The major characteristic of
open primaries is that any registered voter can vote in the primary of either party." R.
BLANK, POLITICAL PARTIES, AN INTRODUCTION 315 (1980), cited in Democratic Party v.
Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 111 n.4 (1981).
A blanket primary resembles an open primary in that a voter need neither publicly
declare nor publicly iecord a party preference. Unlike the open primary system, the blanket
primary permits a voter to vote for candidates from different parties in the same manner as
in general elections. Under a blanket primary system, a voter is not required to affiliate with
a single political party. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality ofNon-Member Voting
in Political Pary Primary Elections, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 259, 261-62 (1978).
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Wisconsin is one of a handful of states4 whose legislature has
adopted the "open primary."5 An "open primary" permits registered
voters to participate in the primary election without publicly announc-
ing or recording the party in whose primary he or she will vote. As a
result, individuals may cross party lines, voting for candidates affiliated
with a party different from that with which the voter is perhaps publicly
affiliated.
The Wisconsin open presidential primary is a public election for
both Democratic and Republican candidates, resulting in the appor-
tionment of delegates to presidential candidates. The State Democratic
Party uses the primary results to apportion delegates to Democratic
candidates, but the primary does not elect the particular state
Democratic delegates.6 The selection of delegates is a separate proce-
dural step in the nominating process, and participation therein is lim-
ited to Democrats who both publicly avow and publicly record their
affiliation with the Democratic Party.7 Thus, although Wisconsin's
open-primary law requires that delegates be apportioned according to
the primary results,8 the primary voters themselves do not elect the
delegates.9
In 1980, the Democratic National Committee (DNC), fearing that
the practice of crossover voting by independents and Republicans
would distort the primary electoral process, adopted Rule 2A.10 Bind-
4. The following states have adopted the open primary: Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 34-904
(1981); Michigan, MicE. STAT. ANN. § 6.1615 (Callaghan Supp. 1981); Minnesota, MnN.
STAT. ANN. § 203A.22-.23 (West Supp. 1981); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-301(2)
(1981); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-22 (1981); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-
3-21 (Supp. 1981); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2363 (Supp. 1981); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 5.37(4) (West Supp. 1980).
5. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.37(4) (West Supp. 1980). The statute reads in part, "The elec-
tor may secretly select the party for which he or she wishes to vote, or the independent
candidates .... "
6. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.60(8), 5.37(4), 8.12(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1980).
7. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (West Supp. 1980).
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(a) (West Supp. 1980).
9. State ex rel La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 519
(1980), rev'd sub nom. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Foliette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981). "Delegates to the national convention are selected by the state party, not by the
voters of the state." 93 Wis. 2d at 485, 287 N.W.2d at 523. No fewer than two-thirds of the
delegates are selected by local congressional district party organizations, and the remaining
third are selected by the state party organization. The state party limits participation in the
delegates selection process to publicly declared Democrats. Id at 485-86, 287 N.W.2d at
524.
10. Rule 2A of the Democratic Selection Rules for the 1980 Democratic National Con-
vention [hereinafter cited as DNC RULE 2A], quoted in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex
rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 109 n.1 (1981), reads in pertinent part: "Participation in the
delegate selection process in primaries or caucuses shall be restricted to Democratic voters
only who publicly declare their party preference and have that preference publicly
recorded."
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ing on the state parties, Rule 2A prohibits the apportionment of dele-
gates to presidential candidates on the basis of a system that does not
require a contemporaneous publicly recorded statement of party pref-
erence. In other words, a state party would be free to use a caucus,
convention," or primary in its presidential nominating process, pro-
vided that the method restricted participation to individuals who pub-
licly declared and recorded their affiliation with the Democratic
Party. 2 The DNC asserted that without such a procedural safeguard,
its constitutionally protected associational rights would be violated. 3
The DNC asserted that abridgement of associational rights would oc-
cur because the results of the primary would not accurately reflect the
views of the party's "true" and "loyal" members, since nonadherents
might have a voice in the primary electoral process.
Rule 2A and the Wisconsin statute providing for an open primary
are inherently in conflict. An "open primary"' 4 and a "public recorda-
11. "The term caucus is used in a number of different senses today. The nominating
caucus is to be distinguished from the meetings or conferences of party members in a legisla-
ture for the purpose of deciding on committee assignments and on the party's position on
public issues; the party caucuses are often referred to as the Senate Republican caucus, the
House Democratic caucus, etc. Before 1830, there were at least three types of nominating
caucuses-the informal type held by party leaders, the legislative caucuses composed of
party members of the legislature, and mongrel or mixed caucuses in which legislators and
outside representatives united to select party candidates." H. BONE, AMERICAN POLITICS
AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 276 n.4 (1965).
The caucus system, as a candidate-nominating device, died in the early 19th century.
Id at 278. See also A. RANNEY, supra note 2, at 15-17. It was criticized by Andrew Jackson
and his supporters as being unrepresentative and susceptible to "bargains" and "deals." H.
BONE, supra, at 276. The vacuum left by the death of caucuses was filled by nominating
conventions (although primaries were also in their infancy at about the same time). The
convention was the dominant method of state and congressional candidate nominating until
the mid-twentieth century. Conventions were thought to be more "democratic" than
caucuses; however, delegate selection to state conventions was not uniform, as it was left to
the individual states to determine the method by which the delegates were to be selected.
Consequently, the convention system was susceptible to as many abuses as was the caucus
system. See H. BONE, supra, at 279.
Currently, "conventions perform. . . functions such as drafting the party platform...
selecting party officers. . and in some states choosing delegates to the national (presiden-
tial) conventions." Id at 280-81.
12. DNC RULE 2A, supra note 10.
13. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1977), the Supreme Court summarized its
holdings on political parties' rights of association. The Court stated, "'There can no longer
be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political
beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments... . The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an inte-
gral part of this basic constitutional freedom."' Id at 487 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973)).
Like most constitutional rights, however, the freedom to associate is not absolute. It
may be limited by a state asserting a legitimate and compelling interest. Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. at 489. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1974).
14. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.60(8) (West Supp. 1980).
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tion of party preference"' 5 cannot coexist in the same election. The
State Democratic Party of Wisconsin cannot structure its delegate se-
lection procedure to accommodate both the state's requirement that the
primary be open and the party's rule demanding a publicly announced
and publicly recorded party affiliation in the allocation of delegates. If
the state law prevails and the open-primary results are applied to allo-
cate delegates per candidate, then the party rules will be subrogated, as
there will have been no public recordation of party preference. If the
party's rule prevails, however, the results of the Wisconsin primary will
be reduced to little more than a "political beauty contest"; the primary
election would amount to a state-sponsored survey of the popularity of
the candidates among the voters. While the voters could vote for their
favorite candidate in the primary, the results would not be used in the
party's apportionment of delegates to the candidates. As the delegates
would then not only be selected but also apportioned by caucus, con-
vention, or some other "closed" system, the primary voters would cast
only an advisory ballot.
The tension between the state law and the party rule resulted in an
actual controversy following the 1980 Wisconsin presidential primary.
The DNC had made clear to the Wisconsin State Democratic Party
(State Party) that compliance with DNC rules was a condition to State
Party participation at the 1980 Democratic National Convention.
16
The State Party was prohibited from using the results of the Wisconsin
open primary to determine how many Wisconsin delegates each presi-
dential candidate would receive at the 1980 convention.' 7 The DNC
based its prohibition on the fact that participation in the Wisconsin
Democratic primary had not been limited to voters who publicly de-
clared their preference for the Democratic Party as required by DNC
rules. 18
The State of Wisconsin, seeking to enforce its open-primary law,
brought an original action in the Wisconsin Supreme Court against the
DNC and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin.1 9 Significantly, the State
Party concurred with the state's assessment that the Wisconsin open-
primary law was valid and could properly be asserted against the state
and national parties.20 The State Party cross-claimed against the DNC,
requesting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court order the DNC to seat its
delegation as apportioned by the Wisconsin primary election. 2'
15. DNC RULE 2A, supra note 10.
16. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 112 (1981).
17. Id at 120 n.21.
18. Id
19. See State ex rel La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 519
(1980), rev'd sub nom. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981).
20. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S, 107, 113 (1981).
21. Id
[Vol. 9:669
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the open primary statute,22
and the Wisconsin Democratic delegation, apportioned in accordance
with the results of the open primary election, was seated at the 1980
National Democratic Convention. The court based its unanimous de-
cision on a balancing of the need to protect partisan associational inter-
ests against the importance of preserving the state's interests in
regulating the electoral process. Determining that the state had a
"compelling... interest in not requiring that voters publicly declare
their party preference and have that preference publicly recorded,"23
the court concluded that the open primary did not impose unconstitu-
tional burdens on either the DNC's associational rights or its right to
govern its affairs through the national convention.
The DNC appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming
that forced compliance with the Wisconsin open-primary statute vio-
lated its associational rights and those of its members under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette,24 the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court and held that
the state's interests and the national party's associational rights could
compatibly co-exist.25 The Court did not address the State Party's
claim.
This note will examine the United States Supreme Court's reversal
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in La Follette. In so doing,
it will explore the nature of the associational rights claimed by the
DNC, the extent of the state's burden on these rights, and the merits of
the state's asserted compelling interest in preserving the overall integ-
rity of the electoral process by providing for secrecy of the ballot, in-
creasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of
the state's voters. This analysis will also distinguish Cousins v.
Wigoda,26 a case dealing with a purely internal party dispute, upon
which the Supreme Court relied in its reversal of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision.
Finally, this note proposes that where party associational rights
have been held to take precedence over conflicting state law, the deter-
mination of those partisan associational rights should be made at the
stateparty level where, as here, the activity in question is chiefly a state
party function.
22. State ex rel La FoHette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d at 482, 287 N.W.2d at 522.
23. Id at 483, 287 N.W.2d at 522.
24. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
25. Id at 124-26.
26. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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I. The Competing Interests
In La Follette, the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that a
national party and its adherents have "a constitutionally protected right
of political association, but a state law may circumscribe that right."'27
It explained that whether or not curtailment or abridgement of those
rights offends the United States Constitution depends on "the right
claimed, the nature and scope of the limitation and whether there is a
sufficient state interest to justify the limitation."2 The United States
Supreme Court by relying on Cousins v. Wigoda purported to use the
same balancing test.29 The majority opinion, however, does not indi-
cate that the Court examined the issue using the above analytical steps.
A. The Nature of the Right Claimed: Freedom of Association
It is generally accepted that political parties enjoy associational
rights that are rooted in the constitutional guarantees of the rights of
petition, assembly, and free speech °.3  As important as a party's and its
members' associational rights may be, however, they are not absolute. 1
A state may subordinate a party's associational rights when the justifi-
cation for such subordination is based upon a "compelling" state inter-
est. 2 In La Follette, while the DNC argued before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court that its associational rights had been violated by the
Wisconsin open-primary law, the national party presented no factual
support for its contention.33
The importance of the primary as a party function was not dis-
puted 34 and was recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as such:
[T]he primary is a step in the process of selecting a candidate who
will be the Party's standard bearer; that the primary is a substi-
tute for closed slate-making by party leaders; and that although
27. 93 Wis. 2d at 495, 287 N.W.2d at 528.
28. Id
29. 450 U.S. at 120-24.
30. See note 13 supra.
31. 450 U.S. at 124.
32. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 489.
33. "The National Party's own materials indicate that Wisconsin's open primary pro-
duces an electorate which is as representative (or as unrepresentative) of 'Democratic identi-
fiers in the electorate' as is the electorate produced by closed primaries and caucuses which
are acceptable to the National Party." 93 Wis. 2d at 508, 287 N.W.2d at 534 (citation omit-
ted). The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held that the National Party's assumptions that
enough voters who "do not have a commonality of interest" with the Democratic Party will
raid the primary and thereby "jeopardize [its] integrity" are unsupported. Id at 508, 287
N.W.2d at 533.
34. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the importance of the primary as a party
function as well as its significance as a state function. It stated, "Thus both the state and the
party have an interest in protecting the integrity of the primary... as a party function." 92
Wis. 2d at 499-500, 287 N.W.2d at 530.
[Vol. 9:669
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the primary broadens participation in slate-making, the primary
election remains to some extent a party function.
3
The court also recognized that the primary serves apublic function
by nominating candidates for the general election. Given the primary's
public and private functions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, citing
Aarchioro v. Chaney,36 stated that when a party rule is in conflict with
a state statute, the party has the duty of persuading the court that the
state statute "significantly impedes the National Party as it seeks to
achieve its stated purposes and objectives. '37 If the party were not re-
quired to show such harm, it would prevail over conflicting state law
whenever party leaders adjudged the state law to be incompatible with
partisan interests. Associational rights should be afforded judicial pro-
tection when they are critical in enabling parties to achieve their pur-
poses and objectives. If a state law does not impede this process,
however, the party should establish that its associational rights have
been significantly infringed upon before the state is required to demon-
strate its compelling interest in enacting the legislation.38 Nevertheless,
the United States Supreme Court, as will be discussed below, imposed
no such burden of proof on the National Party, finding its bare allega-
tion of significantly infringed rights to be sufficient.
The Democratic National Committee's Rule 2A was ostensibly
adopted to protect the integrity of the primary as a party function and
to protect the party's associational interests "from intrusion by those
with adverse political principles."39 The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
35. 93 Wis. 2d at 499, 287 N.W.2d at 530.
36. 442 U.S. 191 (1979). In farchioro, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Washington state statute that required each major political party to have a state committee
consisting of two persons from each county in the state against a challenge by members of
the Democratic Party that the statute violated their right ot association as secured by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id at 199 n.15. "The state court reasoned that although
'substantial burdens' on the right to associate for political purposes are invalid unless 'essen-
tial to serve a compelling state interest,' these appellants failed to establish that this statute
had imposed any such burden on their attempts to achieve the objectives of the Democratic
Party. Since this initial burden had not been met, the court upheld the constitutionality of
the challenged statute." Id at 195 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court also dist-
inguished ,farchioro from Cousins. "Cousins v. Migoda... upon which appellants place
their primary reliance, does not support their claim here. In Cousins, unlike this case, there
was a substantial burden on associational freedoms. This fact alone distinguishes the two
cases, and renders Cousins inapposite." Id at 199.
37. 93 Wis. 2d at 499, 287 N.W.2d at 530.
38. The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979), and
American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 790 (1974), for the proposition that the National
Party has the burden of persuading the court that the Wisconsin statute "significantly
infringe[d] [on] the National Party's associational rights." 93 Wis. 2d at 499, 287 N.W.2d at
530.
39. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1952). Another view is that DNC Rule 2A was
adopted to more tightly define and limit public participation in the presidential nominating
process. This approach would have the advantage of assisting an incumbent Democratic
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however, did not agree that a "declaration of Democratic Party prefer-
ence at the time of voting"40 would accomplish the National Party's
expressed purpose:
Defining who is and who is not a Republican or Democrat, defin-
ing the commonality of interest which binds Democrats or
Republicans, or defining the Republican's or Democrat's com-
mitment to the party are key issues which have not, as far as we
can tell, been resolved by the parties. The significance of the dec-
laration of preference is far from clear.4'
In short, the court was acknowledging that under DNC Rule 2A,
non-Democrats could still pollute the partisan process. The mere pub-
lic recitation of party preference would not keep Republicans or in-
dependents from participating in the Democratic Party's primary,
caucus, or convention. Anyone could assert allegiance to the Demo-
cratic Party for the purpose of participating in the nominating process.
Even in a closed-primary state, nonmembers could register as Demo-
crats and distort the process. The DNC offered no proof that a public
avowal and recordation of partisan loyalty would in fact protect its as-
sociational rights to any greater degree than the open primary. More-
over, the requirement that participants in the Democratic primary state
publicly and in writing their partisan affiliation could discourage many
Democrats from participating in the nominating process. Although
voters might consider themselves Democrats and wish to vote in the
primary, they may value their anonymity or fear retributions from em-
ployers, business associates, church members, or purveyors of comput-
erized mailing lists if forced to declare party affiliation publicly.
Consequently, a forced declaration of party affiliation could deter
many individuals who are true adherents of the Democratic Party from
participating in the primary; DNC Rule 2A could have a more chilling
effect on the exercise of associational rights by individuals than the
open-primary statute could be said to have on the rights of the party.
Party affiliation is an intangible allegiance that, while often transi-
tory and varying in degree, may nonetheless find effective expression in
an open primary as well as in a closed primary. The DNC did not
substantiate its claim that its rights are violated by the open-primary
law. It was unable to prove that Rule 2A operates to preserve associa-
tional rights in a manner and to a degree not provided for by the opera-
tion of the Wisconsin statute.
president, since the incumbent Democratic president appoints the national Democratic
chairperson and the DNC becomes, in large part, a tool of the White House. The DNC
machinery could be employed with greater efficiency to turn out a vote favorable to the
incumbent when the incumbent, through his political operators, sets the limits as to who
may and who may not vote.
40. 93 Wis. 2d at 500-01, 287 N.W.2d at 531.
41. Id at 501, 287 N.W.2d at 531 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 9:669
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court side-stepped the
weighing and balancing approach because it did not consider to what
extent the state actually infringed upon the national party's interest. It
held that the DNC was not required to bear the burden of proving a
significant infringement of its associational rights. The national party
had only to assert such an infringement. The Court posed the issue in
the following manner:
The State argues that its law places only a minor burden on the
National Party. The National Party argues that the burden is
substantial, because it prevents the Party from 'screen[ing] out
those whose affiliation is. . .slight, tenuous, or fleeting,' and that
such screening is essential to build a more effective and responsi-
ble Party. But it is not for the courts to mediate the merits of this
dispute. For even if the State were correct, a State, or a court,
may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of
the Party.
42
In sum, the majority is content to accept the national party's claim of
substantially burdened associational rights, whether or not such an as-
sertion is grounded in fact. Under the majority analysis, the national
party need only allege that a party rule protects a fundamental freedom
and that a state law substantially abridges that freedom.43 The major-
ity view indicates that the courts need not inquire into the merits of this
claim, but should accept the party's assertion on its face. The state
must then show compelling state interests justifying a substantial in-
fringement on associational rights, although the infringement itself
might be very minor. By giving the national party such great license to
label infringements on its associational rights as "substantial," the
Court has invited a political party to challenge state laws affecting its
operations whenever it chooses and regardless of whether or not the
facts merit such a determination.
Given the majority's position, the issue becomes whether or not
the state has such compelling interests as to justify the limitation.
B. The State's Compelling Interests
Wisconsin asserted that its open-primary statute furthered its legit-
imate interest in protecting the "overall integrity of the electoral pro-
42. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24 (footnotes
omitted). In his dissent, Justice Powell responded to the majority view stating, "I am unwiU-
ing-at least in the context of a claim by one of the two major political parties-to conclude
that every conflict between state law and party rules concerning participation in the nomina-
tion process creates a burden on associational rights." Id at 130 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. 450 U.S. at 123-24. "[A] state, or a court, may not constitutionally substitute its own
judgment for that of the Party." Id
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cess."'44 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed, finding this interest to
include: protecting the associational rights of the party; protecting the
rights of the State's citizens to vote, to associate for political purposes,
and not to disclose their party preference; and insuring that the primary
itself and political party participation therein are conducted in a fair
and orderly manner.
The state's protection of the above interests was intended to pre-
vent the resurgence of past abuses of the political process. The political
history of the State of Wisconsin, with its distinct populist influence,
illustrates the attempt by state government to protect the welfare of its
citizens against corrupt leadership." The smoke-filled rooms replete
with bribes, influence peddling, and under-the-table power brokering
were eschewed by the Wisconsin Progressives under the leadership of
Robert M. La Follette, Jr.47 Implementation of the open primary was
one of many political reforms that offered citizens the opportunity to
have significant input into the process of electing a president. By tak-
ing control over the selection of candidates away from party bosses, the
open primary put the people in direct control. Since the primary was
"open," employers, political machines, and others could not harass vot-
ers concerning their political affiliations.48
When voters are free to make a choice in the polling booth by
voting on the basis of candidate merit rather than party label, they need
not fear intimidation by those who might disagree with their party of
choice. The state's protection of these interests works toward achieving
the most desirable of democratic goals-the election to office of those
individuals best qualified to serve.
Not only did the Wisconsin Court detail the historical significance
of the open primary,49 but as recently as 1979, the Wisconsin State Leg-
islature indicated its overwhelming and continuing support for the
44. 93 Wis. 2d at 512, 287 N.W.2d at 536. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
the Wisconsin open-primary law employed the least drastic means available to insure the
protection of its compelling interests. Id at 514, 287 N.W.2d at 537. See United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960). See also
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court articulated the least drastic
means test. "[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id at 377.
45. 93 Wis. 2d at 500, 287 N.W.2d at 530.
46. See id at 492, 287 N.W.2d at 526-27.
47. The Wisconsin Supreme Court chronicled the impact of the Progressive Movement
on Wisconsin state politics and concluded that the open primary not only reflected the Dem-
ocratic goal of the reform era, but has endured as a significant feature of the state's political
system. See id
48. See id
49. Id at 492-95, 287 N.W.2d at 526-28.
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measure.
5 0
While the United States Supreme Court found that Wisconsin has
a substantial interest in the manner in which its elections are con-
ducted, the Court found that these interests are not jeopardized by the
DNC's delegate selection process. Instead, the Court concluded that
these asserted interests related only to the open primary:
The state asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall
integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot,
increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing har-
assment of voters. But all those interests go to the conduct of the
Presidential preference primary-not to the imposition of voting
requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventu-
ally selected as delegates.5"
The Court focused on its distinction between the administration of
the primary and the selection of delegates. The real problem, however,
was not the conflict between the primary and the delegate selection pro-
cess, but the incompatability of the open primary and the apportion-
ment of delegates-a process which precedes the selection of delegates.
It is a truism to say that every voter is entitled to a vote that
counts.5 2 Primary votes will not count if the delegates are not appor-
tioned and are not bound to vote according to the primary results. In
an attempt to accommodate the two interests, the Court explained that
the interest of the National Party in preserving its associational rights
by employing DNC Rule 2A, and the interests of the state in regulating
the manner in which its elections are conducted, are not mutually ex-
clusive. The Court reasoned that "to the limited extent [the interests]
clash,"'53 both could be preserved if the state would remove the "bind-
ing" characterization of its open presidential primary on the apportion-
ment of delegates.54 While on its face this appears to be a feasible
alternative, in reality it is not. Once the binding characterization is re-
moved, the state interests are no longer provided for. In his dissent,
50. On September 5, 1979, by a unanimous vote of its Senate and a 92-1 vote of its
Assembly, the Wisconsin Legislature reaffirmed by joint resolution the "firm and enduring
commitment of the people of Wisconsin to the open presidential preference primary law as
an integral element of Wisconsin's proud tradition of direct and effective participatory de-
mocracy." Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. at 115 n.14.
51. Id at 124-25 (footnotes omitted).
52. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), in which Chief Justice Warren observed,
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government."
Id at 555. See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
53. "450 U.S. at 126.
54. "The National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin from conducting an open pri-
mary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it cannot require that Wisconsin delegates to
the National Party Convention vote there in accordance with the primary results, if to do so
would violate Party rules." 450 U.S. at 126. See also id at 134 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell recognized the unreasonableness of the majority's
solution:
The Court does not dispute that the State serves important inter-
ests by its open primary plan. Instead the Court argues that these
interests are irrelevant because they do not support a requirement
that the outcome of the primary be binding on delegates chosen
for the convention. This argument, however, is premised on the
unstated assumption that a non-binding primary would be an ade-
quate mechanism for pursuing the state interests involved This as-
sumption is unsupportable because the very purpose of a
Presidentialprimary, as enunciated as early as 1903 when Wiscon-
sin passed itsfirst primary law, was to give control over the nomina-
tion process to individual voters. Wisconsin cannot do this, and still
pursue the interests underlying an open primary, without making the
open primary binding 55
In a time when many voters stay away from the polls because of
the belief that their single vote will not make a difference in the polit-
ical process, the Court has effectively chosen to reinforce that belief.
Following the Court's reasoning, the rank and file could support one
candidate, but the state party professionals could ignore the primary
results and instead rely on the results of a separate and unrelated pro-
cess of caucuses or conventions that could produce a totally different
distribution of delegates per candidate. In such an instance, the voters
would merely be participating in a charade of representative govern-
ment with the actual decisionmaking once again taking place in the
confines of the "smoke-filled room." The Court should not attempt to
dismiss the profound effects of its decision with the unsupportable dis-
claimer that both Wisconsin state and national party interests can si-
multaneously be preserved. An open primary that has no binding
effect on the allocation of delegates to candidates has no impact on the
political process and is a futile electoral gesture. The asserted interests
of the state cannot be served by a nonbinding primary. It is the binding
nature of the Wisconsin open presidential primary that preserves those
state interests of protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the
sanctity of the individual's vote. 6
55. 450 U.S. at 134 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
56. "We must consider, finally, whether the State has compelling interests that justify
the imposition of its will upon the appellants .... The State asserts a compelling interest in
preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, in-
creasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing harassment of voters. But all those
interests go to the conduct of the Presidential preference primary-not to the imposition of
voting requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually selected as dele-
gates. Therefore, the interests advanced by the State do not justify its substantial intrusion
into the associational freedom of members of the National Party." 450 U.S. at 124-26 (foot-
notes omitted).
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Evidence of further error in the Court's reasoning is given by the
majority's use of Cousins v. Wigoda to avoid analysis of the competing
associational rights and state interests.
II. The Court's Reliance on Cousins v. W'goda
The intraparty dispute giving rise to the cause of action in Cousins
v. Wigoda 51 arose in the context of the 1972 campaign for the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination. The battle lines were drawn between
the old-line party machine, led by Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago,
and Illinois Democrats opposed to Daley, who had advocated electoral
reform of the State and National Parties' presidential nominating
processes.
Wigoda and other Daley supporters had been elected delegates to
the 1972 Democratic National Convention in the March 1972 Illinois
primary according to Illinois state law. Cousins and other Democrats,
in an attempt to replace the Wigoda delegates with an alternate slate,
challenged the seating of the Wigoda delegates at the national conven-
tion. The challengers asserted that the Wigoda delegates had been
elected in violation of the National Party's delegate selection rules.59
Supporting the Cousins challenge, the DNC's Credentials Committee6"
57. Id at 121 (citing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483, 491 (1975)).
58. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
59. The Illinois election law provided that voters select particular slates of delegates.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-I to -65 (Smith-Hurd 1965). The DNC, however, narrowly
circumscribed the conditions under which slate-making was permitted. The 1972 DNC
Guideline C-6 reads as follows:
"In mandating a full and meaningful opportunity to participate in the delegate selection
process, the 1968 Convention meant to prohibit any practice in the process of selection
which made it difficult for Democrats to participate. Since the process by which individuals
are nominated for delegate positions and slates of potential delegates are formed is an inte-
gral and crucial part of the process by which delegates are actually selected, the Commission
requires State Parties to extend to the nominating process all guarantees of full and mean-
ingful opportunity to participate....
"[The Commission requires State Parties to adopt procedures which assure that:
"I. the bodies making up the slates have been elected, assembled, or appointed for the
slate-making task with adequate public notice that they would perform such task;
"2. those persons making up each slate have adopted procedures that will facilitate
widespread participation in the slate-making process, with the proviso that any slate
presented in the name of a presidential candidate in a primary State be assembled with due
consultation with the presidential candidate or his representative.
"3. adequate procedural safeguards are provided to assure that the right to challenge
the presented slate is more than perfunctory and places no undue burden on the challengers.
"When State law controls, the Commission requires State Parties to make all feasible
efforts to repeal, amend or otherwise modify such laws to accomplish the stated purpose."
DNC GUIDELINE C-6 (1972), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 479-80 n.l.
60. The role of the Credentials Committee is illustrated by the following: "Normally,
the party's National Committee issues a Call to the National Convention to the official state
party organization in each state. In accordance with state election law and state party proce-
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concluded that the Wigoda delegates had been elected through proce-
dures that, while in compliance with Illinois state law, did not conform
to the DNC's delegate selection requirements.
An injunction issued by the Circuit Court of Cook County and
affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court prohibited each of the Cousins
delegates "'from acting or purporting to act as a delegate to the Demo-
cratic National Convention . '..."61 Nevertheless, the Credentials
Committee recommended to the full convention that the Wigoda dele-
gates be unseated and that the alternate slate of Cousins delegates be
seated in their place. The Democratic National Convention adopted
the Credentials Committee's report, and the Cousins delegates partici-
pated fully in all subsequent convention proceedings, 2 in violation of
the injunction issued by the Illinois court.
The narrow question addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Cousins was "whether the Appellate Court was correct in ac-
cording primacy to state law63 over the National Political Party's rules
in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to
the Party's National Convention."'  The Court held that the lower
court was not.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that while there
may be a legitimate state interest, the "subordinating interest of the
State must be compelling. . . to justify the injunction's abridgment of
the exercise by petitioners and the National Democratic Party of their
constitutionally protected rights of association."6 5
Although Justice Brennan concluded that the National Party's
rights to association should prevail over the state's expressed interest,
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger, who all con-
curred in the result, cautioned against too broad an application of
Cousins. They noted that the Cousins holding should be read narrowly
so as not to "foreshadow results in cases not before us."66
dures, a delegation is selected to represent the state party at the national convention. If a
question develops as to how delegates are to be selected or which delegates in fact are se-
lected, this issue is normally resolved according to state law and state party practices." J.
JAMES, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION 115 (1974). When the state party
cannot decide, the Credentials Committee of the National Party will resolve the issue of
contested delegates. J. PARRIS, THE CONVENTION PROBLEM 62-68 (1972).
61. 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973), quotedin Cousins, 419 U.S. at 480.
62. 419.U.S. at 481.
63. The state law in question was ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-1 to -65 (Smith-Hurd
1965). See also Wigoda v. Cousins 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614, 626-31 (1973).
64. 419 U.S. at 483.
65. Id at 489 (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958)).
66. 419 U.S. at 494 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The argument can be made that the
facts ofLa Follette fall outside the narrow Cousins holding. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stewart, however, voted with the majority in La Follette. A possible explanation for these
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The majority in La Follette chose to blur the factual distinctions
between the 1980 Wisconsin controversy and the 1972 Illinois party
fight, and relied on Cousins for the proposition that any state interfer-
ence with the National Party's delegate selection process impermissibly
impedes the exercise of constitutionally protected associational rights.
67
Cousins should be applied only to strictly internal party disputes. For
example, while the holding may cover the actual process of selecting
delegates, it does not control issues concerning the significance of state
legislation directing the time, place, and manner of conducting a pri-
mary as part of the presidential nominating process.
The factual distinctions between La Follette and Cousins fortify
the inapplicability of Cousins. Whereas in Cousins, the votes cast in the
primary election were applied directly to the election of individual del-
egates to the 1972 National Party Convention, in La Follette, the votes
cast in the primary did not elect delegates to the national convention.
In La Folette, the delegates were selected in a separate procedural step
by publicly declared Democrats. The primary vote determined only
the allocation of delegates per candidate; it did not determine who the
delegates would be.
Furthermore, the controversy in La Follette was not the result of a
mere intraparty dispute, rather it arose because of the direct conflict
between a state law and a national party rule that applies not to the
election of delegates to the national convention but to the apportion-
ment of delegates to candidates. Apportionment, in contrast to selec-
tion, is more than an internal partisan matter. The facts of La Follette
differed from those in Cousins, since in the latter case the Illinois state
law did not conflict with the national party rules. As the Wisconsin
Supreme Court observed:
In Cousins . . . Illinois' sole interest was to protect the result of
its primary. . . . Unlike Cousins, the State Party [in La Follette]
cannot comply with both the statute and the National Party
Rules. Unlike Illinois, Wisconsin's interest is not merely to pro-
tect the results of the primary. Wisconsin has a compelling state
interest in maintaining the special feature of its electoral law-a
primary which permits private declaration of party preference.
68
Cousins does not stand for the sweeping proposition that every
conflict between state and party must be resolved in favor of the party.
votes can be made out, not by closely scrutinizing the legal text, but by evaluating the practi-
cal political climate in which the case arose. In the aftermath of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976), political action committees flourished, while the expansion of political parties was
limited by strict regulation of candidate contributions. Perhaps these justices ignored their
own cautionary note in Cousins in order that they might give a legal transfusion to national
political parties, which had grown anemic following the Buckley decision.
67. See generally 450 U.S. at 121. See also id at 128-29 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. 93 Wis. 2d at 521, 287 N.W.2d at 541.
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Indeed, Cousins held that when a political party's associational rights
conflict with a state law, the proper analytical approach is the one ap-
plied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court: an examination of the nature
and extent of the intrusion in light of the state's compelling interests to
determine whether or not there has been an actual and unjustifiable
limitation on First Amendment freedoms.6 9 Although the United
States Supreme Court mentioned this approach in La Follette, it did
not make a determination that the party's associational freedoms actu-
ally had been burdened by the state primary law. Moreover, the Court
did not address the extent of the alleged burden; therefore, it was un-
able to balance the burden effectively against the state's interests. By
skipping this important analytical step, the United States Supreme
Court merely cited Cousins; it did not rely on the Cousins test.
Had the Court made a complete examination of the infringement
of associational rights, it would have considered the extent to which the
State Party's associational rights were involved. Since the State Party
articulated its associational interests as being compatible with state
election law, the issue raised is: When both a state party and a national
party assert that a determination of their respective associational rights
is central to the resolution of a legal dispute, and the nature and scope
of those rights are not similarly defined, whose associational rights view
prevails-that of the national party or of the state party?
III. Who Defines Partisan Associational Rights?
The United States Supreme Court did not discuss one important
aspect of the La Follette case-the position taken by the State Party. In
contrast to the DNC, the State Party indicated that the Wisconsin open
primary served both the state and the national parties' associational
interests better than other means approved by the DNC, including
closed primaries, caucuses, and conventions.7" This view reflected the
69. In Wigoda, the Court explained, "The National Democratic Party and its adherents
enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association. 'There can no longer be any
doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs
and ideas is a form of "orderly group activity" protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. . . . The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an inte-
gral part of this basic constitutional freedom. . . . [A]nd of course this freedom protected
against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the states."' 419 U.S. at 487 (cita-
tions omitted).
The next step in the Court's analysis provided, "We proceed, however, to considering
whether the asserted state interest justifies the injunction. Even though legitimate, the 'sub-
ordinating interest of the State must be compelling. . .' to justify the injunction's abridg-
ment of the exercise by petitioners and the National Democratic Party of their
constitutionally protected rights of association." 419 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted).
70. Briefof the Democratic Party of Wisconsin, Respondent and Cross-Claimant at 13-
14, State ex rel La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 579 (1980).
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State Party's concern that the primary should aid the democratic goals
of the nation's electoral process by promoting the widest possible pri-
mary participation by all those who considered themselves
Democrats.71
The Court has recognized that the adherents of both national and
state parties possess associational rights. In La Follette, however, the
Court ignored the question of whose concept of associational rights-
the State Party's or the DNC's-should determine the method by
which to apportion state delegates to presidential candidates. There is
a strong argument to be made that the State Party's associational rights
dominate. Whereas the staging of the national convention is a national
party function,72 the process of allocating state party delegates to candi-
dates and deciding who may participate in the voting process resulting
in that allocation is a state party function.73 As the Supreme Court
noted in Cousins, the state parties are "'affiliated with a national party
through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the
national convention.' ,,7 In Wisconsin, the State Party considers its ad-
herents to be all those who affiliate, albeit privately, with the party in
the sanctity of the polling booth. What right, then, does the DNC have
to circumscribe that decision narrowly and to undermine the State
"Significantly, none of the procedures which are acceptable to the Democratic Party of the
United States for apportioning delegates among various candidates produces participants
which come close to fairly reflecting the statistical makeup of 'Democratic identifiers in the
electorate.' Indeed, the Wisconsin Open Primary might be the procedure which most accu-
rately reflects the beliefs of all Democratic identifiers in the general electorate. In any event,
there is no factual basis for concluding that the Wisconsin Open Primary materially inter-
feres with the associational goals of the Democratic Party of the United States." Id
71. The respondents argued that "[t]he Wisconsin Open Primary provides the only ve-
hicle whereby all of the voters of all political persuasions can cast their vote for the person
they believe to be the best qualified for the office of President of the United States. Thus,
rather than hindering the associational objectives of the Democratic Party of the United
States, the Wisconsin Open Primary actually assists the Democratic Party of the United
States in identifying the person with the greatest appeal among all of the voters who are
involved in the election in November." Id at 12.
The brief went on to conclude, "Thus, Wisconsin's Open Primary has been singled out
as demonstrative of a primary electorate which comes close to the Democratic general elec-
torate in November. Such a result is hardly adverse to the interests of the Democratic
Party." Id at 15.
72. C. COTTER & B. HENNESSY, POLITICS WITHOUT POWER, THE NATIONAL PARTY
COMMITTEES 61 (1964).
73. For a discussion of state procedures for presidential nominations, see M. JEWELL &
D. OLSON, AMERICAN STATE POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 278-83 (1978). Note,
however, that the process of delegate selection is determined at the state level, but recent
trends, especially in the Democratic Party, have limited that role somewhat. See id at 278.
See also J. PARRIS, supra note 60, at 52. Other than the three varieties of primaries already
mentioned (open, closed, and blanket), there are two other methods of delegate selection-
appointment by party leaders and caucuses/conventions.
74. 419 U.S. at 489 (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952)) (emphasis added).
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Party choice as to the appropriate means by which to determine who is
and who is not a Wisconsin Democrat?
The political party system reflects two fundamental concepts of the
American system of government: federalism7 and the right of the gov-
ernors to rule stemming from the consent of the governed. Both con-
cepts relate to the division of responsibility between national and state
party levels. Decentralization of power is a significant characteristic of
American national party organizations and reflects the effect of federal-
ism on the development of American parties. Although it is not sur-
prising that the media promote the national party conventions, it is a
mistake to assume that a nationalparty is much more than an "umbili-
cal cord between national conventions. 76 Moreover, the state parties
have political identities apart from their affiliation with the national
parties. The several thousand county committees, wards, precincts, and
state parties bear most of the responsibility for carrying on the day-by-
day political work. On a practical level, this activity includes, among
other things, candidate recruitment, image building, fund raising,
maintaining office space and staff, acting as a liaison between local,
state and national officials, staffing precinct positions, canvassing vot-
ers, and providing services to voters with problems and complaints.
77
Just as the fifty states bear the main responsibility for regulating
and administering elections in the United States, 78 it is appropriate that
75. See generally T. DYE, POLITICS IN STATE AND COMMUNITIES (1969). As Dye ex-
plained the relationship, "Federalism has had a profound effect on the organization of
American parties. Decentralization of power is the most important characteristic of Ameri-
can Party organizations." Id at 92. Judson James, in American Political Parties in Transi-
tion, expressed a similar view:
"The American interpretation of democratic theory, expressed in the dominant institu-
tions of American government, de-emphasizes majority rule to protect minority rights.
Americans emphasize and celebrate decentralization and checks and balances. The federal
system, the separation of the executive from the legislative, written constitutions, and judi-
cial review all reflect the desire to insure individual freedom by limiting government. These
limitations operate by setting parts of the government against the other parts. Diffusion of
authority creates a great number of centers of power, each with considerable capacity to veto
the initiatives and programs of the others. Negatively inclined government (federalism) is
therefore explicit in the design and impact of the government structure; the American gov-
ernment is deliberately decentralized and limited ...
"Therefore, the relation of political parties to the structure of government (federalism)
is twofold. Because governmental authority is widely distributed, competition for this au-
thority creates multiple centers of influence within the party reflecting the different basis of
influence achieved or sought. . . . [P]arties also provide informal coordination of the dis-
persed formal governmental structure." J. JAMES, supra note 60, at 9-10.
76. C. COTTER & B. HENNESSY, supra note 72, at vi.
77. See generally id at 10; T. DYE, supra note 75, at 92-94; R. HUCKSHORN, PARTY
LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (1976); J. JAMES, supra note 60, at 81-89; V. KEY, supra
note 2; A. SINDLER, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 73-74 (1966).
78. "[T]he states have reached a variety of decisions on such questions as who can vote,
when they can vote, whether primaries are open or closed, how long officials can serve,
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state political parties be in charge of defining their associational rights
as they assist the states in conducting primary elections. To forbid a
state party from writing its own electoral agenda based on its percep-
tion of the associational rights of its members would be to require it to
become but a "miniature of the national party, something which it
clearly is not." 9 "[Although] the national party organization is most
developed ...in presidential election years. . . [its] primary focus
on the nomination, campaign, and election of a president underscores
the sporadic and discontinuous character of its efforts, and its sharing
of power with local parties suggests the limits of its authority." 0
If it is a "commonality of interest"' that the courts are seeking to
protect by underlining the importance of partisan associational rights,
it is important to recognize that "at election time in the United States
groups and individuals come together in association almost as acciden-
tally and irrationally as molecules of gas come together in a cham-
ber.' 82 Political writers generally acknowledge that the architects of
party policy-the drafters of the party platforms-try to impress all
while offending none to make the structure under which their "adher-
ents" rest as broad as is politically possible.8 3 Consequently, the "com-
monality of interest" approach at the national political level becomes
which candidates are chosen on a partisan ballot, how many elected officials there are, and
what kinds of issues are submitted to the voters for a decision. Although many of these
political ground rules take the form of statutes rather than constitutional provisions, they are
not frequently changed. Although the national government (usually through the judiciary)
has imposed certain standards-generally to broaden participation and prevent discrimina-
tion-there are many areas in which the states are free to make their own choices. Even
when there has been a strong national trend to adopt legislation, such as the direct primary
movement early in the 20th century, the states have usually responded to the trend in some-
what different ways. The constitutional and statutory ground rules have the effect of perpet-
uating a certain kind of political system in each state. Although they result from political
traditions and practices, they have a continuing impact on the political system and the cul-
ture within which it operates." M. JEWELL & D. OLsoN, .supra note 73, at 3.
79. C. COTrER & B. HENNESSY, supra note 72, at 10. "Just as the national committees
do not comprise single and simple national headquarters, so, too, the national committees
may not be the headquarters for parties that are national. This is a way of pointing out that
a total of over six thousand county committees, together with more than one hundred states
and territorial committees (and a few active congressional district committees), share with
the national committees the responsibility of winning elections." Id
80. A. SINDLER, supra note 77, at 73.
81. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d at 499-508, 287 N.W.2d at
530-33.
82. C. COTTER & H. HENNESSY, supra note 72, at 8.
83. The platform is generally viewed as a coalition building document. One authority
views the platform as "a device to build interest group support. The value of the national
party convention platform in recognizing a variety of claimants as important participants in
a political party is that each group that is satisfied by the pledges is given reasons to feel part
of the party and to support it. Group leaders who lose out in the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential nomination still have reason to feel welcome and have a symbol of success (a
platform plank) to display to their membership." J. JAMES, supra note 60, at 114.
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something of a joke as both parties attempt to have everything in com-
mon with everybody.
Since state parties are not mere clones of their national parent,
they promote a system of government in which those who govern are
most responsive to the wishes of those they govern. State parties, com-
posed of a myriad of local units, are closer to the rank and fie than is
the national party. The constituency orientation of American politics
results in state parties being "more inclined to fit their programs to
popular demands within their states . . . In short, parties in each
state tailor their policies to local conditions."84 This observation is evi-
denced by the Wisconsin State Democratic Party's embracing the polit-
ical traditions of the state in which it operates and by its support of
legislation popular with the Wisconsin electorate-the open primary.
The composition of state parties varies widely from state to state,
and Democrats from different geographical regions may not share com-
mon ideological bonds." The most they may be said to have in com-
mon is a party label. The national party, by superimposing its view of
associational rights on the state parties, undermines the integrity and
individuality of the state parties by forcing an artificial uniformity
upon them.86 The Court, by failing to address the question of whether
or not a state party's claim should control the question of associational
rights, has indicated its approval of the national party's indifference to
state parties' rights. By permitting the national party to impose a limit-
ing and ineffective rule on the state parties' assertion of associational
rights, the Court has not furthered the rights of political association but
has impaired them.
Conclusion
Because of the judicial confusion regarding the proper application
of Cousins, states and political parties have found themselves in a legal
twilight zone when their rights and interests have been found to con-
flict. Certainly, from a practical standpoint, it is of small value to adju-
dicate the questions posed by such state-party conflicts long after the
dust has settled following an election.87 Of course, the judicial determi-
84. T. DYE, supra note 75, at 94.
85. Indeed, Ranney pointed out that our political system provides for "almost
boundaryless conceptions and permissive legal definitions of party membership." A. RAN-
NEY, supra note 2, at 193. The American political party "is less an organization able to
define even minimal conditions for those who seek to enter it than an open forum within
which persons participate when and if such participation makes sense to them." M. JEWELL
& D. OLSON, supra note 73, at 53.
86. See generally R. HUCKSHORN, supra note 77, at 265.
87. In La Follette, the Court stated, "This case is not moot. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court's order is not explicitly limited to the 1980 Convention. The effect of the order 're-
mains and controls future elections.' Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816. In any event,
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nations will apply to future elections, but the damage resulting from a
post-election adjudication of rights cannot be reversed in an opinion.
In La Follette, the Court's response to this muddled legal quagmire was
a poorly reasoned application of Cousins to an inapposite factual situa-
tion, with no consideration of whether a determination of partisan affil-
iation for the purpose of participating in a state primary should be
made at the state or national party level.
Since La Follette indicates that the Court is not likely to uphold
state laws challenged on the ground of violating partisan associational
rights, a state's strongest argument might depend on the defense of its
statutes by state parties. After all, state parties and their adherents also
enjoy associational rights. When national party rules may violate these
rights, the Court should first resolve the question of whether the func-
tion performed by the party is a state or national party activity. When,
as with the Wisconsin open primary, the activity is at the state level, the
state party, not the national party, should provide the definitional yard-
stick by which associational rights are measured. Moreover, that the
national-state party dispute could be construed as an intraparty fight
should not lead the Court to dismiss the controversy as nonjusticiable.
The question of whose associational rights controls is but a threshold
problem. When the political process results in a stalemate where
neither the state party nor the national party is willing to concede that
the other's associational rights should prevail, the judiciary should re-
solve the issue. Only then can the larger question of partisan associa-
tional rights and asserted state governmental interests be clearly
focused and resolved.
even if the order were clearly limited to the 1980 election year, the controversy would be
properly before us as one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review."' 450 U.S. at 115 n.13
(citation omitted).
The experience of history demonstrates that each election is not a separate isolated
event but is instead a part of a continuing chain of events. When the Court fails to adjudi-
cate properly the respective rights of the parties, as in La Follette, the damage extends not
only to the 1980 election but has future consequences as well. The results of the 1980 elec-
tion may foreshadow our political future for years to come. In short, once the candidates are
nominated and the elections are held, no judicial determination can return the parties or the
country to the status quo.

